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INTRODUCTION
Two recent court actions have threatened to topple Congress’
protection of live musical performances by finding the federal antibootlegging statutes1 unconstitutional.2 These opinions, issued
three months apart from district courts in New York and
California, the heart of America’s entertainment industry, affect
more than the collecting habits of a few avaricious fans.3 If these
decisions are upheld and widely followed, not only will
bootlegging laws be outside the scope of Congress’ lawmaking
authority, but the United States also will be incapable of enforcing
a uniform policy that would comply with article 14 of the TRIPs
agreement—an accord sponsored and signed into law by the
President harmonizing American intellectual property law with the
laws of 110 other signatory nations.4 This is an expensive
proposition both in terms of trade sanctions that may be brought to
bear5 and in terms of American leadership in the world of

1

18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000);17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), appeal
docketed, No. 04-5649 (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2004) (finding the criminal anti-bootlegging
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, to be unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause and
thereby dismissing indictment of defendant for bootlegging); KISS Catalog v. Passport
Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2004), appeal docketed, No. 0457077, (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2004) (finding that the section of the civil anti-bootlegging
statute that prohibited the unauthorized distribution of the unauthorized recording of live
performances, 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), was unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause).
3
See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425; KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
4
See Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 326 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]; pertinent sections
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27–TRIPs_01_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2005). “In respect of a fixation of their performance on a phonogram, performers
shall have the possibility of preventing . . . [inter alia,] the fixation of their unfixed
performance and the reproduction of such fixation.” Id., art. 14, ¶ 1. A comprehensive
summary of the TRIPs Agreement is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
5
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 42–46, 59–61 (establishing remedies of,
inter alia, injunctions, compensatory damages and other equitable relief); see also Int’l
Intell. Prop. Alliance, Copyright Enforcement Under the TRIPs Agreement (Oct. 19,
2004), at http://www.iipa.com/rbi/2004_Oct19_TRIPs.pdf (listing the various
enforcement provisions of the TRIPs Agreement).
2
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intellectual property law.6 The rationale behind these decisions
would also effectively stymie Congressional efforts to regulate in
the area of “neighboring rights,” an increasingly vital segment of
intellectual property law in our networked, speed-of-light world.7
Title 18, § 2319A of the U.S. Code and 17 U.S.C. § 1101 vest
an exclusive right to record or transmit a live performance in the
performer(s).8 The central holdings in Martignon9 and KISS
Catalog10 are that these rights are “copyright-like” and subject,
therefore, to the limitations of the Copyright Clause.11
6

See Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA Provisions on Intellectual Property, 4
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 267, 270 (1993) (discussing the options of
the international community in responding to violations of intellectual property
agreements, including using trade as “leverage”).
7
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 287–88 (2d ed. 1995) (“A term used to express the concept of rights not equal
to copyright but which relate to or are a ‘neighbor’ of copyright. . . . ‘Neighboring rights’
confer a more limited level of protection than copyright.”).
8
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000) with 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000). The provisions
are identical but for the requirement in § 1101 that the act be done “knowingly and for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” The remedies are identical
as well in that infringement “shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502
through 505, to the same extent as an infringer of copyright.” The United States fulfilled
its obligation under TRIPs by enacting § 2319A (codifying § 513 of the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act, 108 Stat. 4809, 4975 (1994)), providing for criminal penalty. Section
2319A reads in pertinent part:
(a) Offense.––Whoever, without the consent of the performer or performers
involved, knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain––
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance in
a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a
performance from an unauthorized fixation;
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or
sounds and images of a live musical performance; or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers
to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in
paragraph (1), regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United
States;
shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years or fined in the amount set forth in
this title, or both, or if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, shall be
imprisoned for not more than 10 years or fined in the amount set forth in this
title, or both.
9
346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
10
350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
11
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–77 (1803) (“Congress may not enact copyright-like
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These decisions marked a dramatic shift from the decision of
the Eleventh Circuit five years earlier, where that court held in
United States. v. Moghadam12 that the Commerce Clause13 could
provide an alternative authority for the enactment of antibootlegging legislation.14 In contrast, the Martignon and KISS
Catalog courts assume that the Commerce Clause or the Necessary
and Proper Clause could have provided Congress with the requisite
authority, but this only would be material “if the Copyright Clause
did not restrict Congress’ legislation in this field.”15
This new direction in the jurisprudence, if affirmed, would
undermine Congress’ ability to regulate the information economy,
in a manner reminiscent of the Lochner era.16 By binding
Congress to the four corners of the Intellectual Property Clause,17
legislation, such as the anti-bootlegging statute, under the commerce clause (or any other
clause), when the legislation conflicts with the limitation[s] imposed by the Copyright
Clause.”)); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (“Since the Court cannot include a limited term of its own accord, the Court
holds that the current version of the statute creates perpetual copyright-like protection in
violation of the ‘for limited Times’ restriction of the Copyright Clause.”). For more on
jurisprudential limitations on court creation of limited copyright terms, see Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
12
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc denied,
193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000).
13
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress authority “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States”).
14
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274–82 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting
Congress authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers”)).
15
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425 n.14.
16
Between 1897 and 1937, the Supreme Court aggressively restricted state and federal
economic regulation in order to protect freedom of contract and property which was
considered fundamental to individual autonomy.
“Lochnerism” is considered
synonymous with judicial overreaching. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-3 to 8-4 (1988) (“[L]aws aimed at redistributing resources
would by their very nature fall outside the legislative function. Governmental actions
which sought to benefit some persons at the expense of others were perceived as
dangerous and exceptional. If such activities were not based on notions of corrective
justice between parties, they were merely disguised forms of robbery.”); see also Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (requiring more than the possible existence of some
small amount of “unhealthiness” to warrant legislative interference with a liberty right).
17
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The grant of authority to Congress “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” allows
Congress to enact both the patent and copyright systems. “Intellectual Property Clause”
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this interpretation of the Constitution would create a new public
right that would displace the traditional First Amendment
balancing of interests with a bright-line and blanket rule within the
Constitution’s body.18 Congress would be unable to protect artistic
or scientific expression that does not meet the requirements of a
restrictive interpretation of the textual provisions of the Intellectual
Property Clause. This would strip Congress of its ability to
respond to accelerating changes in information technology19 that
are currently challenging the Framers’ twenty-seven word
provision.20
This Comment argues that in deference to Congress’ vested
authority, before one Article I, Section 8 power is found to
impliedly limit another, a functional and structural21 analysis is
necessary to determine whether an actual conflict exists. The
Martignon and KISS Catalog opinions do not include a finding that
the anti-bootlegging statutes actually undermine, or interfere with,
the Copyright Clause.22 Rather, both opinions apply Railway
refers to clause 8 taken as a whole. “Copyright Clause” refers only to the copyright
aspect of the provision.
18
See Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 319–24 (2004).
[I]f the constitutional interests captured by the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause are a limit on Congress’s ability to grant exclusive rights, those interests
operate through the First Amendment itself—they neither require nor suggest
reading the Intellectual Property Clause’s limits externally . . . . If granting
exclusive rights does raise speech–related concerns, there is no possibility that
Congress can avoid them by using the commerce power; the First Amendment
itself applies to all legislation, regardless of the power under which Congress
legislates . . . . The very existence of the First Amendment belies any argument
that the Intellectual Property Clause’s limits represent independently
enforceable, speech-related constitutional norms.
Id.; see also Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:
The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1119, 1138 (2000).
19
See Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1138; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
20
See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
21
See generally WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION ch. 4, § VI (3d ed. 2003).
22
The Martignon court found 18 U.S.C. § 2319A to be “fundamentally inconsistent
with Copyright Clause limitations.” See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413,
428 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The KISS Catalog court found that 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)
“violates ‘the for limited Times’ requirement of the Copyright Clause.” See KISS Catalog
v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Neither opinion
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Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,23 in which the Supreme Court
held that the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause
impliedly limits Congress’ discretion to enact bankruptcy laws
under the Commerce Clause, as a categorical and bright-line rule.24
The analogy to Gibbons, in a context where the textual and
structural elements that compelled its result are absent, effects a
radical transformation of the Copyright Clause; the constitutional
phrase “Writings” is reduced to the scope of the Copyright Act’s
“fixation requirement” and both “Writings” and “for limited
Times” are endowed with the same preclusive effect as the
uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. The result is
similar to building a wall in the middle of a front porch instead of a
gate at the property-line; by erecting the “fixation requirement” as
a barrier against copyright-like protection, the court would
artificially restrict the Copyright Clause to the current confines of
the Copyright Act.
Recognizing that the Copyright Clause is broader than the
Copyright Act, this Comment suggests that Congress’ discretion to
enact copyright-like protections is restricted only where the
“essential” purpose of the Copyright Clause is threatened.25
Copyright-like statutes that, in the balance, “promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts” are constitutional under either the
Commerce Clause or the Copyright Clause itself.26 This approach
preserves the Constitutional scheme and, at the same time,

elaborates on how this inconsistency or violation undermines the Copyright Clause. See
infra Part III.
23
455 U.S. 457 (1982).
24
The United States in its brief has also taken a categorical position. Both the district
courts and the government would constitutionalize the Copyright Act’s “fixation
requirement” as a bright-line rule. The Martignon court would limit the scope of
copyright’s protections to fixed works: thus Congress would have no authority to
regulate unfixed works via the Commerce Clause. The government would limit the scope
of copyright’s restrictions to fixed works: thus Congress would have plenary authority to
regulate unfixed works via the Commerce Clause. Both of these categorical approaches
effect an artificial bifurcation of the constitutional copyright power: a result that is
legislatively inefficient and harmful to the Constitutional scheme. See supra notes 311–
15 and accompanying text.
25
See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
26
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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preserves Congress’ broad discretion to protect intellectual
property.27
Part I of this Comment presents the background leading up to
the Martignon and KISS Catalog decisions, emphasizing the antibootlegging statutes’ goals of protecting the domestic recording
industry and implementing the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). This part also presents
the controversy sparked by the enactment of the anti-bootlegging
legislation, as well as the arguments for and against
constitutionality.
The 1999 decision in United States v.
28
Moghadam is also summarized in this part in some detail,
because the recent decisions fundamentally depart from the
Moghadam court’s reasoning.
Part II summarizes the opinions in United States v. Martignon
and KISS Catalog v. Passport International Productions, Inc.,
which share the common rationale that copyright-like statutes may
not be enacted under the Commerce Clause, contrary to the
holding in Moghadam.
Part III analyzes this rationale and argues that this categorical
approach has yielded a skewed result that should not be upheld at
the appellate level. Analogizing to the Court’s functional analysis
in separation of powers issues, this Comment advocates for a
functional approach to questions of the compatibility between
copyright-like statutes and the Copyright Clause—an approach
more in keeping with the deference due to Congress in matters of
economic policy.
27

See Brief for the United States of America at 16, United States v. Martignon, appeal
docketed, No. 04-5649 (2d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Martignon Brief for the U.S.]; Brief of
Amici Curiae UMG Recordings, Inc., EMI Music North America d/b/a Capitol Records,
Inc., Univision Music LLC, d/b/a Univision Music Group, National Academy of
Recording Arts & Sciences, American Federation of Musicians of the United States and
Canada, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Recording Artists
Coalition and National Music Publishers Association, Inc. In Support of Reversal, at 13,
United States v. Martignon, appeal docketed, No. 04-5649 (2d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter
UMG Amicus Brief]; Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Association of American Publishers;
American Business Media; CoStar Group, Inc.; The National Association of Realtors;
Reed Elsevier Inc.; and The Software & Information Industry Association Supporting
Reversal, at 21, United States v. Martignon, appeal docketed, No. 04-5649 (2d Cir. 2005)
[hereinafter Ass’n of Am. Publishers Amicus Brief].
28
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
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This analysis reveals that the mere lack of “fixation” does not
create an inherent conflict with the Copyright Clause and that the
anti-bootlegging statutes are a form of protection which Congress
has extended in the past within the Copyright Act itself.29 This
Comment labels this narrow class of protections “proto-copyright”
because the protections therein are a precursor to full copyright
protection, encompassing original works that are poised to be fixed
in a tangible medium of expression. This Comment posits that this
form of circumscribed protection is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause and possibly under the Copyright Clause as
well.
In conclusion, this Comment rejects the Martignon/KISS
Catalog rationale as overbroad; if appellate courts affirm this
approach in a departure from Mohagdam, the United States will be
unable to meet its obligations under TRIPS,30 the President will be
hindered in future trade negotiations, and legislative attempts at a
uniform intellectual property standard for the nation will be
confounded.31
I. THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION:
CONTEXT AND CONTROVERSY
The anti-bootlegging statutes were enacted in 1994 on a fasttrack basis,32 bundled within the omnibus Uruguay Rounds

29
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are
being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being
made simultaneously with its transmission.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52–53
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745 (discussing the various measures
Congress considered or enacted regarding the Copyright Act).
30
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14, ¶ 1 (providing in relevant part that
TRIPs “[i]n respect of a fixation of their performance on a phonogram, performers shall
have the possibility of preventing . . . the fixation of their unfixed performance and the
reproduction of such fixation.”)
31
See infra Part I.B.
32
See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1407–08 (1995)
(“Procedurally, [the Uruguay Round Agreement Act’s] most salient feature is that it was
implemented on a fast-track basis . . . . [B]oth the House and the Senate managed to issue
lengthy reports on the Act.
Those reports contain virtually nothing about
copyright . . . .”).
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Agreement Act.33 As a consequence, 17 U.S.C. § 1101 and 18
U.S.C. § 2319A received little attention, and Congress passed the
legislation without debate and with essentially no legislative
history.34 In considering the nature and purpose of the statutes, the
courts are left, as a result, with only the text of the statutes
themselves and the context of their adoption into federal law.
A. Scope and Nature of the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
Courts define bootlegging as “the sale of wholly unauthorized
recordings of performances by musical artists which frequently are
produced by individuals who smuggle tape recorders into live
performances or who record live performances broadcast over the
radio or television.”35 The anti-bootlegging statutes protect live
musical performances by providing legal recourse against anyone
who records or transmits a performance without the permission of
the performer(s).36
The statutes also protect against the
reproduction and distribution of such unauthorized recordings.37
The civil statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1101, provides the same remedies as
copyright infringement, including injunction, impoundment,
destruction, damages, and, at the discretion of the court, costs and
attorneys fees.38 The criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A,
penalizes commercial bootlegging activity with fines based on
33
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(codified in Titles 7, 15, 17–19, 21, 26, 29 and 35 of the United States Code).
34
See S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994). There is no House Report for the
legislation.
35
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Recording Industry Association of America at 2, United
States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2180) [hereinafter RIAA
Amicus Brief] (citing RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 852 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)); see also Stephan Braun, Hot Acts, Hidden Microphones; Recordable CDs Give
Concert Pirates a Bootleg Up. Industry Wants Laws Fine-Tuned, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1999, at A1 (“Music bootlegging—the unsanctioned taping and distribution of rare,
unreleased recordings and concert material—is a hobby gone haywire, part black market,
part crusade. It is an outlaw trade of hustlers who cater to the voracious appetites of
music buffs who can never get enough, fans who scheme and pay whatever it takes to
obtain souvenirs of the performances of their idols.”).
36
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000); supra note 8 (providing
relevant statutory text and analysis).
37
See id.
38
See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000) (establishing liability under 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–05
(2000)).
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victim impact statements and/or up to five or ten years
imprisonment for first or second offenses respectively.39 The
statute also mandates forfeiture and destruction of the recordings
and, at the discretion of the court, of the recording equipment.40
B. Policies of the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
The anti-bootlegging statutes are the product of a two-pronged
legislative initiative thirty years in the making.41 The statutes
protect the domestic music industry from the depredations of
bootleggers and, concurrently, align American standards of
protection with international trading partners.42
1. Domestic Protection
The anti-bootlegging statutes are an outgrowth of Congress’
ongoing efforts to protect the interests of the American recording
industry.43
Copyright protection was first extended to
44
phonorecords in the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971.45
That amendment was enacted in response to the “widespread
unauthorized reproduction of phonograph records and tapes”
amounting to approximately 25% of the value of annual record and
tape sales.46 The Copyright Act of 1976 incorporated these

39
40
41
42
43
44

See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(b) (2000).
See infra notes 43–61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 72–99 and accompanying text.
See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
“Phonorecords” are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. The term “phonorecords” includes the material
object in which the sounds are first fixed.

Id.
45

Sound Recording Amendment Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567. The
report estimated annual piracy amounted to 100 million 1971 dollars where the gross
value of 1971 legitimate record sales was $400 million. Other reasons set forth for this
legislation were denial of artists’ royalties and loss of federal and state tax revenues.
46
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protections47 and Congress subsequently expanded protection of
sound recordings in the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments
Act of 1982,48 the Record Rental Amendment of 1984,49 and the
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995.50
While these statutes protected record companies and artists
from “piracy” of existing recordings,51 they did not protect live
performances from bootlegging activity.52 Prior to 1985, some
Circuits had applied53 the National Stolen Property Act,54 which
imposed criminal penalties for interstate transportation of stolen
property, to interstate trafficking in “bootleg records.”55 However,
the Supreme Court, in Dowling v. United States,56 held that that
statute did not apply to bootleg recordings because such items
“were not ‘stolen, converted or taken by fraud’ except in the sense
that they were manufactured and distributed without the consent of
the copyright owners” of the underlying musical works.57
Performers and producers were left with only a patchwork of state
47
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–14
(2000 & Supp. 2002).
48
Pub. L. No. 97-180 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318–19 (2000))
(imposing criminal and civil liability for trafficking in counterfeit phonorecord labels).
49
17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2000) (prohibiting rental of phonorecords to the public for
commercial gain).
50
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (1995) (granting performance rights in digital transmissions of sound
recordings).
51
See supra notes 45–50; see also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Issues: Anti-Piracy,
at http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) (defining four
categories of music piracy).
52
See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][2]
(2004).
53
E.g., United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter
Dowling I], rev’d, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) [hereinafter Dowling II].
54
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) replaced 18 U.S.C. § 413, which was the National Stolen
Property Act. The history of the statute indicates that it is no longer being called this
name (“Section consolidates §§ 413, 415, 417, 418, 418a, and 419 of title 18, U.S.C.,
1940 ed. . . . Section 413 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., providing the short title ‘National
Stolen Property Act,’ was omitted as not appropriate in a revision.”).
55
Dowling I, 739 F.2d 1445.
56
Dowling II, 473 U.S. at 213.
57
Id. at 208; see also id. at 228–29 (“[T]he rationale employed [by lower courts] to
apply the [mail fraud and interstate transportation of stolen goods] statute to petitioner’s
[copyright-related] conduct would support its extension to significant bodies of law that
Congress gave no indication it intended to touch.”).
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statutory and common law causes of action.58 These remedies
were rarely utilized as they could not address the interstate and,
increasingly, international scope of bootlegging activity.59 Thus,
no uniform protection of live performances was possible until the
anti-bootlegging statutes were enacted.60 Title 18, § 2319A of the
U.S. Code and 17 U.S.C. § 1101 filled a gaping hole in the federal
scheme to protect the domestic recording industry.61
2. International Harmonization
The domestic protection of the American recording industry
paralleled the United States’ increasing prominence as a net
exporter of intellectual property.62 International trade had always
exerted an influence on United States intellectual property policy.63
58
See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.02 (discussing the states’ role
in protecting copyrighted works not fixed in a tangible medium via common law because
federal preemption of the Copyright Act does not apply to such works).
59
See RIAA AMICUS BRIEF, supra note 35, at 12 (“Rare is the performer with a public
following only within a single state who is nevertheless popular enough to be a target of
bootleggers.
Bootleggers ordinarily target nationally and internationally known
performers and for self-evident economic reasons are unlikely to restrict their unlawful
distributions to a single state.”).
60
See id. at 6 (“Given the immense profitability of bootlegging due to recent
technological advancements and corresponding incentives for bootleggers, the growing
worldwide scope of bootlegging, and the insufficiency of previous efforts to deal with the
problem, Congressional enactment of Section 2319A was the right remedy at the right
time. Without the deterrence of Section 2319A, bootleggers could continue their
depredations without fear of a tough, nationwide response coordinated by the federal
government.”).
61
Id.
62
See
Intellectual
Property
Crimes,
at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/fifu/about/about_ipc.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005)
(“Currently, the U.S. leads the world in the creation and export of IP and IP-related
products. The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition recently reported that the
combined U.S. copyright industries and derivative businesses account for more than $433
billion, or 5.68%, of the U.S. Gross National Product, which is more than any other
single manufacturing sector. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that between 1977
and 1996 the growth in the IP segment of the economy was nearly twice that of the U.S.
economy as a whole.”).
63
See, e.g., International Copyright Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106, § 13; Louisiana
Purchase Exposition Act of 1904, 33 Stat. 4, § 7; Ad Interim Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 1000,
§ 4952; Buenos Aires Convention of 1914, http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/The%20Buenos%20Aires%20Convention.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005);
The Universal Copyright Convention of 1952, available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/Protocol%203%20Annexed%20to%20the%20Universa
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However, it was not until the 1980s that the United States
implemented an aggressive policy of harmonization64 with
international standards of protection.65 Facing an appalling trade
deficit and rampant piracy of American products abroad, the
United States reversed one hundred years of reticence and adhered
to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works66 on March 1, 1989.67 Although the Berne Convention
itself granted protection to unfixed works,68 it did not require
member nations to extend such protection,69 and the United States
joined the Convention without providing protection to unfixed
works.70
The policy of harmonization reached a high water mark in
1994 with the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS),71 within the Uruguay

l%20Copyright%20Convention.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). See generally WILLIAM
F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (2000), http://digital-law-online.info/patry/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
64
See generally ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 2.3 (2003).
65
See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals
Transmitted by Satellite, May 21, 1974 (ratified Dec. 7, 1984), 13 I.L.M. 1444, available
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/brussels/pdf/trtdocs_wo025.pdf; General System of
Preferences Renewal Act, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018 (1984); International
Trade and Investment Act, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000 (1984); Berne
Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); Visual
Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (1990); 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(8) (2000) (Berne adherence legislation) (amending 17 U.S.C. §102 (2000) to
include architectural works within the scope of copyrightable subject matter); North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, §
334, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (creating 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000) which provides for certain
copyright protection in motion pictures), 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). See generally PATRY,
supra note 63.
66
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.
67
See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Berne
Convention Implementation Act].
68
See Berne Convention, supra note 66, art. 2, ¶ 1.
69
See id. art. 2, ¶ 2.
70
See Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 67.
71
See supra note 4.
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Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT).72
TRIPs incorporated many of the pre-existing international
intellectual property agreements, including the Berne
Convention,73 the Paris Convention,74 the Washington Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits,75 and the
Rome Convention for performances and neighboring rights.76
TRIPs gave effect to the Rome Convention77 by requiring
protection of performers from the unauthorized recording or
broadcasting of their live performances.78 In compliance with this
obligation,79 Congress enacted the civil80 and criminal81 anti72
See Understanding the WTO: Basics—The GATT Years: From Havana to
Marrakesh, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2005); Understanding the WTO: Basics—The Uruguay Round, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2005); Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809.
The Uruguay Round Agreements are the broadest, most comprehensive trade
agreements in history and were negotiated by 125 countries. They are vital to
our national interest and to economic growth, job creation, and an improved
standard of living for all Americans. These agreements, by lowering tariff and
other barriers to international trade and investment, will lead to increased levels
of world and U.S. output, trade, real income, savings, investment, and
consumption . . . . When fully implemented, these agreements are expected to
increase U.S. GNP by $100–$200 billion per year. They are also expected to
create hundreds of thousands of new, permanent well-paying American jobs
(over and above the normal growth in employment in the economy).
H.R. REP. NO. 103-826(I), at 16 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773.
73
See Berne Convention, supra note 66.
74
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised
July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html.
75
See Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989,
28 I.L.M. 1477, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/washington/pdf/trtdocs_wo011.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
76
See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html#P109_12974.
77
See id. art. 10.
78
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14, ¶ 1 (“In respect of a fixation of their
performance on a phonogram, performers shall have the possibility of preventing the
following acts when undertaken without their authorization: the fixation of their unfixed
performance and the reproduction of such fixation. Performers shall also have the
possibility of preventing the following acts when undertaken without their authorization:
the broadcasting by wireless means and the communication to the public of their live
performance.”).
79
See S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 2–3 (1994).
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bootlegging statutes protecting performers against the unauthorized
recording, transmission to the public, and the sale or distribution
of, or traffic in, unauthorized recordings of their live musical
performances.82
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, signed into law by
President Clinton on December 8, 1994, was the product of eight
years of negotiations amongst 123 nations.83 The United States
strongly advocated for TRIPs, and this placed the United States in
the center stage of “the highest expression to date of binding
intellectual property law in the international arena.”84 Unlike the
prior great conventions, TRIPs included enforcement requirements
and noncompliance with agreed provisions could trigger trade
sanctions tied to the larger GATT agreement.85 Thus the antibootlegging statutes have ongoing significance to the nation’s
global trade policies.86
C. Constitutional Basis for the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
The anti-bootlegging statutes immediately raised questions of
Constitutional dimension that the scarce legislative history could
not answer.87 Many commentators viewed federal protection of
live performances as an erosion of the traditional boundary

80

17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
82
See supra note 8.
83
The Uruguay Round of GATT began in September 1982 and was signed by the
participating ministers on April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. This officially ended
GATT and began WTO. See Understanding the WTO: Basics—The Uruguay Round, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2005).
84
See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 1391–92.
85
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 42–46, 59–61; Int’l Intell. Prop. Alliance,
Copyright Enforcement Under the TRIPs Agreement (Oct. 19, 2004), at
http://www.iipa.com/rbi/2004_Oct19_TRIPS.pdf; Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA
Provisions on Intellectual Property, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 267,
270 (1993).
86
See supra note 72.
87
See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 1408–09 (“One seeks in vain for evidence that anyone
in Washington even considered the constitutional basis for these vitally important [antibootlegging] amendments to the copyright law.”).
81
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between copyright and the public domain.88 David Nimmer hailed
“the end of copyright,” suggesting that copyright, empowered by
the Commerce Clause, now served the “new master” of
international trade.89
These commentators view the antibootlegging statutes as a juggernaut threatening centuries of
carefully crafted Constitutional limits.90 The developing split
among the Circuits91 attests to the complex balancing of state,
federal, legislative, and judicial interests enmeshed in the question
of the implied and express limits on Congressional authority to
reshape the contours of copyright. This Comment suggests that the
anti-bootlegging statutes do not run afoul of these limits which
have already been clearly and fully set down by the Supreme
Court.92
The Intellectual Property Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the U.S. Constitution, grants Congress the authority “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.” Two centuries of Supreme
Court decisions93 and consistent Congressional practice94 had
88
See, e.g., Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That––A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature)
Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595, 602–05 (1996) (“Most students of copyright would concur,
at some level, that the limited times language expresses more than an incidental or
technical constraint on federal grants of intellectual property protection, at least where
copyrightable subject matter is concerned.”).
89
See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 1412 (“Copyright, it seems, now has a new
master . . . . [C]opyright now serves as an adjunct of trade . . . .”).
90
See id. at 1416.
91
See supra notes 10–12.
92
See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); see also Bonito
Boats v. Thundercraft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1988).
93
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (interpreting “Writings” as “any physical rendering
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor”) (citing The Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)); cf. CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1007 (1967) (“[W]hile more precise limitations on “writings” might be
convenient in connection with a statutory scheme of registration and notice, we see no
reason why Congress’ power is so limited.”).
94
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression. . . .”). Although the fixation requirement was first made explicit in the
Copyright Act of 1976, prior law required publication with notice or registration with the
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seemingly embedded a “fixation requirement” into the meaning of
“Writings.”95 Since live performances are inherently “unfixed” the
anti-bootlegging statutes seemed to contravene that requirement.96
The Clause also states, in plain terms, that exclusive rights may
be granted to authors only “for limited Times,”97 a limitation also
consistently enforced within the Copyright Act.98 “A federal
copyright statute that purported to grant copyright protection in
perpetuity would clearly be unconstitutional.”99 If the antibootlegging statutes failed to meet these copyright requirements,
the question remained whether the Commerce Clause could
provide an alternative authority for their enactment as “copyrightlike” statutes.100
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution grants
Congress authority to regulate activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce,101 even if those activities themselves are
entirely intrastate in nature.102 The anti-bootlegging statutes,
enacted to protect “the $12 billion recording industry,”103 and
pursuant to international trade agreements, satisfied the Commerce
Clause threshold requirements.104
However, commentators
disagreed as to the effect of the Intellectual Property Clause’s
words of limitation upon other Article 1, Section 8 powers.105

Copyright Office, necessitating a fixed form. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule
of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 721 (2003).
95
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 1.08[C][2].
96
See id.
97
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
98
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 1.05[A][1].
99
Id.
100
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the legislative authority “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”).
101
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
102
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
103
See RIAA Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 3 (stating that “[t]he recording industry is
a major sector of the U.S. economy, with 1997 sales exceeding $12 billion”).
104
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999).
105
See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 1409 (“[N]o respectable interpretation of the word
‘Writings’ embraces an untaped performance of someone singing at Carnegie Hall.”); see
also Susan M. Deas, Jazzing up the Copyright Act? Resolving the Uncertainties of the
United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567, 570 (1998)
(“The most obvious constitutional departure . . . is how [the anti-bootlegging statutes]
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Some espoused a broad “structuralist” approach to constitutional
interpretation that proscribed the use of the Commerce Clause to
make “end runs” around the express limitations of the Copyright
Clause.106 Others viewed the Intellectual Property Clause as an
independent grant of Congressional authority.107
1. Traditional View of the Intellectual Property Clause
Traditionally, the Copyright Clause has been viewed as an
entirely positive grant of power to Congress.108 The copyright
power permits Congress to vest authors with the right to exclude
others from unauthorized reproduction, distribution, performance,
display, and adaptation of their work.109 This grant traditionally
extend[] protection to unfixed material under the authority of a congressional
enactment.”).
106
See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1119, 1177 (arguing that the history and structure of the Intellectual Property Clause
militates against Congressional authority to enact certain legislation); Jaszi, supra note
88, at 602–05; Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the
Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 63–64 (2000) (“To allow
Congress to do things under its general commerce power that it is forbidden to do under
its specifically applicable copyright and patent power would in essence read the
Copyright and Patent Clause out of the Constitution.”); William Patry, The Enumerated
Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 394–97 (1999); Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment,
Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress
by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 503–06 (2003)
(arguing that an impermissible conflict is created whenever Congress acts under any
constitutional provision in a manner that frustrates an explicit constitutional purpose set
out in a different provision); Joseph C. Merschman, Comment, Anchoring Copyright
Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on
Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661, 677 (2002).
107
See Nachbar, supra note 18 (positing that an accurate evaluation of the Intellectual
Property Clause’s place in the Constitution requires a new approach that recognizes that
not all of the limits of Article I powers are of equal constitutional weight and that
considers the constitutional significance of the restrictions in question); see also Shira
Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 324 n.5 (2002) (“The
text of the preambular phrase in the Copyright Clause does not limit the desired ‘progress
of science’ to ‘incentives for creation.’ Thus, even assuming the phrase operates as a
substantive constraint on congressional power, it does not prevent Congress from
considering the entire range of possible means by which progress may be promoted.”).
108
Hetherington, supra note 106, at 484–85.
109
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
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has been construed as an incentives scheme.110 Without exclusive
rights, free-riders would sell works at unreasonably low prices that
do not reflect the time and effort invested in their production.111
This would drive authors from the market.112 Congress’ copyright
power avoids this loss of intellectual potential by authorizing
Congress “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts”
by granting a limited monopoly.113 Therefore, copyright is an
economic policy affecting private business interests and does not
implicate larger constitutional concerns that would affect
Congress’ ability to act under another Section 8 power.114
Proponents of Congress’ authority to enlarge the scope of these
incentives beyond the limits of the Copyright Clause point to cases
where Congress has enacted legislation under one Constitutional
power to achieve an end proscribed under another.115
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,116 the Supreme
Court held that the Commerce Clause justified the public
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,117
even though similar provisions proscribing private discrimination
within the Civil Rights Act of 1875118 had been declared beyond
the scope of Congress’ authority under § 5119 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.120 This illustrates the general proposition that
Congress’ various grants of authority, in this case the 14th
110

See generally SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 64, § 1.3.1.
See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197,
1204 (1996).
112
Id. (At a price derived from a copyright–free world “the author would realize no
financial return on his investment in creating the work. In this world, only authors
unconcerned with financial return would produce creative works.”) (citing William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 328 (1989)).
113
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
114
See Nachbar, supra note 18, at 291.
115
Id.
116
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
117
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
118
43 Cong. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
119
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that “[t]he Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]”).
120
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (holding that “the act[s] of
[C]ongress of March 1, 1875, entitled ‘An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal
rights,’ are unconstitutional and void . . .”).
111
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independently and in the alternative to one another.121
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operate

In The Trademark Cases, the Supreme Court held that the
Copyright Clause could not sustain the 1876 Trademark Act
because a trademark “is simply founded on priority of
appropriation” and not on originality in authorship.122 Although
that Court found that the Act was not justified by the Commerce
Clause either, under the modern concept of the Commerce
Clause,123 the Act would have been upheld. The constitutionality
of modern federal trademark laws124 therefore attests to Congress’
ability to enact intellectual property laws that are beyond the scope
of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 by using its Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 authority.125
The principle that, generally, Congress’ enumerated powers are
nonexclusive is also supported by Authors League of America, Inc.
v. Oman,126 in which the Second Circuit held that a statute
withholding copyright protection for imported publications127 and
121

See, e.g., Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
123
The 1870 Act did not have a jurisdictional component that would limit its scope to
interstate commerce. The modern view of the Commerce Clause permits intrastate
regulation of matters that “substantially affect” interstate commerce, such as trademarks.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1942).
124
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 17, and 28 U.S.C.).
125
In The Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of Atlanta, the Court did not explicitly address
the question of whether Congress may enact legislation under the Commerce Clause that
is precluded from enactment under Constitutional provision. See, e.g., Maya Pollack,
Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar
Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 297–98 (1995) (noting that the Court did allude to
Congressional power to enact legislation outside of the Intellectual Property Clause).
126
Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986) (Oakes, J.,
concurring).
127
See 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000). The “manufacturing clause” protected domestic
printers by restricting the ability of foreign printers to receive copyright protection for
books shipped to the United States:
[T]he importation into or public distribution in the United States of copies of a
work consisting preponderantly of nondramatic literary material that is in the
English language and is protected under this title is prohibited unless the
portions consisting of such material have been manufactured in the United
States or Canada.
122
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codified within the Copyright Act, could not be sustained under the
Copyright Clause because the statute did not “promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts.”128 Instead, the Authors League court
found that the statute was a legitimate exercise of its Commerce
Clause power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.129
Under this traditional view, the express and implied limitations
of the Intellectual Property Clause—namely the requirements that
the work be a “Writing,” that protection be extended only for
“limited Times,” and that the progress of Science and the useful
Arts be promoted—apply only when Congress is legislating under
that power, and should not hinder Congress’ ability to enact
copyright-like legislation under the Commerce Clause.130
2. Structuralist Views of the Intellectual Property Clause
A pattern of recent holdings has signaled to many observers
that the Rehnquist Court has rejected the view that each of
Congress’ enumerated powers is “hermetically sealed . . . such that
Congress may ignore the restrictions on its power contained in one
clause merely by legislating under another clause.”131 Instead, the
Court seems to have adopted a structural approach to defining the
scope of Congress’ enumerated powers.132
In United States v. Lopez, the Court put an end to fifty years of
judicial deference to Congress’ own conception of its Commerce
Clause authority.133 Striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act
128

Authors League, 790 F.2d at 223–24.
Id. (“In our view, denial of copyright protection to certain foreign-manufactured
works is clearly justified as an exercise of the legislature’s power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations.”). However, the Second Circuit did not determine that the
challenged statute had actually violated an express limit of the Copyright Clause. Id.
130
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[E]ach of
the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other powers, and what cannot be done
under one of them may very well be doable under another.”); see also Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
131
Patry, supra note 106, at 371 (1999); see also supra note 106.
132
See generally MURPHY ET AL., supra note 21, ch. IV, § VI.
133
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (“[S]ome of our prior cases
have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action . . . .
The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to
conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something
129
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of 1990, the Court held “that [the commerce] power is subject to
outer limits” and that Congress could not use its authority to
regulate commerce in a way that “would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local . . . .”134 In
United States v. Morrison, the Court reiterated this limiting view of
the Commerce Clause, holding that Congress had exceeded its
commerce power in granting a private right of action to redress
gender-motivated violence.135 In these and other decisions such as
Printz v. United States,136 City of Boerne v. Flores,137 and Clinton
v. New York,138 the Court has shown a readiness to invalidate
legislation that exceeds the defined and limited powers of the
federal government.139
In Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,140 the Court
struck down a Commerce Clause statute that conflicted with the
Bankruptcy Clause, another Article I, Section 8 power of
Congress.141 The Rock Island Transition and Employee Assistance
Act (RITA) provided former employees of the bankrupt Chicago,
Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Company with unemployment
benefits valued at seventy-five million dollars.142 These funds
were to be distributed from the company’s bankruptcy estate with
priority over the claims of unsecured creditors.143 The Court found
the statute directly conflicted with the uniformity requirement of

not enumerated, . . . and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local . . . . This we are unwilling to do.”).
134
Id. at 557.
135
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (holding the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”) unconstitutional for lack of Congressional
authority either under the Commerce Clause or the enactment provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment). This holding, as well as the holding in Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, is compelled
by the implied limits of federalism, while others have enforced the structural implications
of the separation of powers. See generally MURPHY ET AL., supra note 21, at 548–56.
136
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down provisions of the Brady Handgun Bill).
137
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
138
524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down the Line Item Veto Act).
139
See supra notes 133–38; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)
(“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited . . . .”).
140
455 U.S. 457 (1982).
141
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
142
Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 462.
143
Id. at 463.

DANITZ

1166

11/21/2005 1:11 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XV

the Bankruptcy Clause.144 Justice Rehnquist expressed the view of
the Court that a specific limitation on one of Congress’ enumerated
powers145 may, under some circumstances, restrict Congress’
ability to legislate under an alternative power:146
Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause itself
contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon
Congress’ power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform
throughout the United States . . . . Thus, if we were to hold
that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform
bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we
would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the
power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.147
Like the Bankruptcy Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause
incorporates specific terms of limitation.148 Therefore, if Gibbons
applies as a general rule by preventing Congress from avoiding
other Article I, Section 8 limitations by invoking other, broader
clauses, then Congress is proscribed from enacting copyright-like
laws under the Commerce Clause.149
a) William Patry’s “Negative Right”
William Patry posits that “[u]nder the Court’s structural
approach, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 contains both positive and
negative rights: a positive right to grant authors a limited
monopoly in their original material, and a negative right in the
public to copy unoriginal material.”150 Professor Patry and other

144

Id. at 468–69.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (containing 17 clauses enumerating Congress legislative
powers).
146
Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468–69.
147
Id.
148
See Pollack, supra note 125, at 320 (“Under certain circumstances, other
Constitutional provisions may act as limits upon the Commerce Clause. These include
the Bankruptcy Clause, and the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Twenty-first Amendments.
These various provisions have kept Congress from utilizing the Commerce Clause as a
means to avoid the provisions’ requirements.”).
149
See supra notes 148–55.
150
Patry, supra note 106, at 362.
145
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commentators maintain that Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft Boats151
and Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service,152 two
unanimous decisions authored by Justice O’Connor, have imported
the Court’s structural approach into the heart of the Intellectual
Property Clause.153 Taken together, these decisions establish a
constitutional floor to Clause 8, holding that the means by which
the progress of science and the useful arts is promoted is by
making the “building blocks” of creativity, facts and ideas,
available to the public.154 Public access to uncopyrightable and
unpatentable subject matter, as well as access to copyrightable and
patentable subject matter after the period of protection expires, is
therefore the benefit of the bargain contemplated in the
Constitution: limited monopoly rights in original works in
exchange for public access to the ideas and facts they embody..155
The scope of this “negative right,” and whether it acts as an
absolute bar to legislation of copyright-like statutes under the
Commerce Clause, is the subject of vigorous debate and the nub of
the issue in controversy in Moghadam,156 Martignon,157 and KISS
Catalog.158
b) Thomas Nachbar’s “Constitutional Norms”
Thomas Nachbar’s structural approach to the enumerated
powers of Congress suggests that the Intellectual Property Clause
should operate independently of other clauses.159 Professor
151

489 U.S. 141 (1988) (“[T]he Clause contains both a grant of power and certain
limitations upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent monopolies
of unlimited duration, nor may it ‘authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available.’”) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
152
499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Feist, the Court, reaching the constitutional issue sua
sponte, stated plainly that originality is “a constitutional requirement” and the essence of
copyright. Id. at 346.
153
See Patry, supra note 106, at 367.
154
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350 (“[T]he raw facts may be copied at will. This result is
neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress
of science and art.”).
155
Id.
156
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
157
346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
158
350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
159
See generally Nachbar, supra note 18.
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Nachbar suggests that “whether a specific restriction on a specific
Article I power must be read externally depends on whether it
reflects an enforceable constitutional norm.”160 A “constitutional
norm” inheres in the fabric of the Constitution.161 Certain norms,
when present, tend to narrow the scope of Congress’ enumerated
powers and broaden the effect of its limitation upon other
enumerated powers.162
These “narrowing norms” include
federalism, the separation of powers, and the individual liberty that
is the foundation of many substantive constitutional rights.163
Professor Nachbar’s analysis finds that in the case of the
Intellectual Property Clause, such narrowing norms operate
weakly, if at all.164 Instead, the countervailing constitutional norm
of favoring legislation by the representative branch of government
in matters of economic policy is controlling.165 Professor Nachbar
finds that the values underlying Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 are
served best through judicial deference to Congress166—the
approach that the Supreme Court has consistently taken to federal
copyright legislation.167
Professor Nachbar’s method recognizes that “a variety of
values are served by the Section 8 limitations,”168 and offers a
means to navigate between the poles flagged by Gibbons169 and
160

Id. at 317.
Id. (a constitutional norm means a rule “required by and even inherent” in the
Constitution).
162
Id. at 318.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 361–62.
165
Id. at 318 (“When the regulation is economic in character—as is intellectual property
legislation—the preference for representative government means that constitutional
ambiguities affecting Congress’s power are read in Congress’s favor.”).
166
Id. at 291 (“There is simply no way to characterize the limits in the Intellectual
Property Clause as so fundamental to the constitutional order as to warrant their inference
as a matter of structure . . . . The Intellectual Property Clause’s limits reflect a policy
choice about the reach of a relatively insignificant form of economic regulation allocating
quasi-property rights between private entities.”).
167
The Supreme Court has never struck down a statute enacted pursuant to the
Copyright Act except for the first federal Trademark Act which was later revisited in the
Lanham Act and promulgated under the Commerce Clause. See supra notes 122–25 and
accompanying text.
168
Nachbar, supra note 18, at 317. Not all Section 8 limits are alike. Compare Gibbons,
455 U.S. at 462, with Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250.
169
See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text.
161
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Heart of Atlanta Motel.170 According to this analysis, the
Intellectual Property Clause exerts no control over other
enumerated powers and Congress’ Commerce Clause authority to
enact copyright-like laws is unencumbered.171
D. United States v. Moghadam
Five years before United States v. Martignon, the
constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statute was considered and
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Moghadam.172
1. Facts and Procedural History
Ali Moghadam arrived in Orlando, Florida, expecting to visit
Disney World and to make some business deals.173 Unbeknownst
to him, the invitation was the climax of a year-long undercover
operation by the United States Customs Service, dubbed
“Operation Goldmine.”174 The sting yielded eleven arrests and
approximately 800,000 compact discs containing bootleg
recordings of performances by the Grateful Dead, Dave Matthews
Band, Bruce Springsteen, Phish, Smashing Pumpkins, Tori Amos,
and the Beastie Boys, amongst others.175
Ali Moghadam was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 2319A by
“knowingly distributing, selling, and trafficking in” unauthorized
compact discs of live concerts.176 On appeal he argued that the
statute was unconstitutional because it could not be legitimately
enacted under any of Congress’ enumerated Article I, § 8
powers.177
The court rejected Moghadam’s constitutional

170

See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
See Nachbar, supra note 18, at 297 (“There is nothing about the arrangement of
powers and limitations in the Intellectual Property Clause to suggest that its limitations,
even its express limitations, reach beyond the Clause itself. The limitation is on a power,
which in turn is bounded by the grant.”).
172
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
173
See Paul Farhi, CD Bootleggers Face the Music: Supply of Illegal Recordings
Shrinks after Customs Crackdown, WASH. POST, July 14, 1997, at A1.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
177
Id.
171
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challenge and affirmed his conviction.178
Moghadam’s
applications for rehearings and for a writ of certiorari were
denied.179
2. Summary of the Moghadam Opinion
The Eleventh Circuit first considered the nature of the antibootlegging statutes,180 and it found that they were best described
as “quasi-copyright” or sui generis statutes “that in some ways
resemble the protections of copyright law but in other ways are
distinct from them.”181 The court noted that the civil statute was
codified in Title 17 and utilized the remedy for copyright
infringement, yet seemed to lack the Copyright Act’s requirements
of limited duration and fixation.182 The court also noted that the
statutes were less extensive than copyright, conferring only the
right to prevent the making of unauthorized sound recordings or
transmissions.183
The court next considered whether the “quasi-copyright”
statute was consistent with the Copyright Clause.184 After briefly
reviewing the historically expanding meaning of the term
“Writings,” the court declined to decide whether “Writings” could
be broadened to encompass live performances.185 Instead, the
court assumed arguendo that the lack of fixation precluded the use
of the Copyright Clause as a source of congressional authority and

178

Id.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, reh’g en banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000).
180
Id. at 1273.
181
Id. at 1272.
182
Id. at 1273.
183
Id. In contrast the copyright clause provides for six exclusive rights. Although not
all of these may apply in any particular work, typically three or more do apply. See 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
184
Id. The only question raised on appeal was whether the lack of a fixation
requirement rendered the statute unconstitutional, and thus, the court declined to consider
whether the absence of a limited duration would render the statute unconstitutional.
185
Id. at 1273–74 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“[W]ritings . . . may be
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or
aesthetic labor.”) (citations omitted)).
179
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proceeded to uphold the statute based on an alternative source of
authority: the Commerce Clause.186
The court pointed out that Congress’ failure to cite the
Commerce Clause as grounds for § 2319A did not dispose of the
question of Constitutional authority.187 Then, applying the test
developed in United States v. Lopez, the court asked “whether a
rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity
sufficiently affected interstate commerce.”188 Considering the
commercial subject of the statute,189 its context as implementation
of an international trade accord administered by the World Trade
Organization, and the “deleterious economic effect” bootlegging
has on the recording industry, the court found that § 2319A
“clearly prohibits conduct that has a substantial effect on both
commerce between the several states and commerce with foreign
nations.”190
Having found that the anti-bootlegging statute meets the Lopez
test, the court next addressed the more difficult question of
whether Congress could use its Commerce Clause power “to avoid

186

Id. at 1280 n.12 (“We assume arguendo, without deciding, that the Commerce
Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the Copyright Clause if the particular
use of the Commerce Clause (e.g., the anti-bootlegging statute) were fundamentally
inconsistent with the particular limitation in the Copyright Clause (e.g., the fixation
requirement).”).
187
Id. at 1275 n.10 (“‘[T]he constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise,’ Woods v. Cloyd W.
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948), and ‘[i]n exercising the power of judicial review,’
we look only at ‘the actual powers of the national government,’ Timmer v. Michigan
Dep’t of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 1997).”) (citations altered).
188
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). In Lopez, the Court held that
the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to legislate regarding three things: (i) the use
of channels of interstate commerce; (ii) instrumentalities and persons or things in
interstate commerce; and (iii) intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. The Moghadam court focused on this third category.
189
In the absence of legislative findings of an interstate commercial nexus and in the
absence of a jurisdictional limit, the Moghadam court would have to “determine
independently whether the statute regulates ‘activities that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[ ]
interstate commerce.’” Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (citing United States v. Olin Corp.,
107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)).
190
Id.
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the limitations that might prevent it from passing the same
legislation under the Copyright Clause.”191
After a review of the relevant case law, the Moghadam court
held that the various grants of legislative authority act
independently and in the alternative to the other powers.192 In
support of Ali Moghadam’s position that the Copyright Clause
limits Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, the court considered
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons.193 The Moghadam
court found that the Court’s decision to restrict the use of the
commerce power in Gibbons was the result of a direct conflict
between the statute and the uniformity requirement of the
Bankruptcy Clause.194 The court found that no such direct conflict
was present in the case in controversy.195
Using a “circumscribed analysis,” the court resolved the
tension between the Heart of Atlanta Motel jurisprudence and
Gibbons by finding that the Copyright Clause itself is a positive
grant which “does not imply any negative pregnant that suggests
that the term ‘Writings’ operates as a ceiling on Congress’ ability
to legislate pursuant to other grants.”196 The court further found
that the anti-bootlegging statute furthered the purpose of, and was
“in no way inconsistent with,” the Copyright Clause.197 Therefore,
Gibbons could not control and the statute was a legitimate use of
Congress’ commerce power under the Commerce Clause.198

191

Id. at 1277.
Id. (“[E]ach of the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other powers, and
what cannot be done under one of them may very well be doable under another.”)
(discussing Heart of Atlanta, Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 241 (1964)).
193
455 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.
194
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279.
195
Id. at 1279–80.
196
See id. at 1279–80 (qualifying that “[t]he Commerce Clause cannot be used by
Congress to eradicate a limitation placed upon Congressional power in another grant of
power” but nonetheless stating “that in some circumstances the Commerce Clause can be
used by Congress to accomplish something that the Copyright Clause might not allow”).
197
Id. at 1280.
198
Id.
192
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II. THE MARTIGNON AND KISS CATALOG DECISIONS
Five years after the Eleventh Circuit decision in Moghadam,
United States District Courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits
revisited the question of the constitutionality of the antibootlegging statutes.199 Despite gestures to distinguish the cases,
these opinions are directly contrary to the holding of the
Moghadam court.200 These decisions apply the rationale of
Gibbons as a bright-line rule.
A. United States v. Martignon
1. Facts and Procedural History
In September 2003, Jean Martignon was arrested by federal
and state law enforcement agents for selling bootleg recordings on
the web, in catalogs, and in a shop through his business “Midnight
Records.”201 On October 27, 2003, Martignon was indicted by a
federal grand jury for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.202 The
indictment included no details as to “the artists that Martignon
allegedly bootlegged, the scope of the bootlegging, or the
distribution of bootlegged works.”203 On January 15, 2004, the
defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds that the antibootlegging statute was unconstitutional.204 In the Opinion and
Order dated September 24, 2004, the motion was granted.205 The
Attorney General filed a Notice of Appeal in the Second Circuit on
October 22, 2004 and Oral Arguments were heard on July 12,
2005.206
2. United States v. Martignon Summary
The Martignon opinion moves briskly to the determination
that, although the anti-bootlegging statute does substantially affect
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

See infra Parts II.A–B.
See infra Parts II.A–B.
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429.
See supra note 11.
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interstate and international commerce, it may only be enacted
under the Copyright Clause because it is “copyright-like” in
nature.207 As such, the statute failed both the fixation requirement
and the limited times requirement of the Copyright Clause and is
therefore unconstitutional.208
As an alternate ground for its holding, the Martignon court
found that “even if Congress may legislate copyright-like statutes
under other Section 8 powers, the express limit of durations must
be adhered to because copyright-like protection must have
boundaries in order to counter-balance the grant of monopoly
power to the artist.”209 Therefore, the court held that the absence
of a durational limitation rendered the statute “fundamentally
inconsistent” with Copyright Clause.210
The court first inquired into the nature of the anti-bootlegging
statute and found that it was primarily copyright-like.211 The court
pointed out that the anti-bootlegging statute was enacted in order to
comply with TRIPs, which “dealt completely with intellectual
property,”212 and that the Senate Report on the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act described the statutes under the general subheading
“Copyright Provisions.”213
The court was also swayed by the fact that the civil antibootlegging statute was codified within the Copyright Act itself214
and that the criminal anti-bootlegging statute was positioned next
to the criminal infringement statute.215 In addition, it observed that
the statute refers to the definition of terms provided within the
Copyright Act and utilizes the phrase “for purposes of commercial
207

See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 428–29.
See id. at 429 (“The anti-bootlegging statute’s failure to impose a durational
limitation on its regulation is ‘fundamentally inconsistent’ with the Copyright Clause’s
requirement that copyright-like regulations only persist for ‘Limited Times.’”).
209
See id. at 428–29.
210
Id.
211
See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422 (“Based on the anti-bootlegging statute’s
language, history, and placement, it is clearly a copyright-like regulation.”).
212
Id. at 420.
213
Id. at 421 (citing the SENATE REPORT ON THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ACT, S.
REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994)); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
214
See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
215
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
208
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advantage or private financial gain,” which appears in the criminal
infringement statute.216
The court finally concluded that the statute is primarily
copyright-like, based on “a plain reading of the statute [which]
makes evident that its purpose is synonymous with that of the
Copyright Clause” and that “it was enacted primarily to cloak
artists with copyright-like protection.”217
The Martignon opinion holds what Moghadam assumed
arguendo: the anti-bootlegging statute cannot satisfy the
“Writings” requirement of the Copyright Clause because a live
performance is not fixed.218 The court applied the structural model
of the relationship between the enumerated powers as articulated
by the Supreme Court in Gibbons,219 and by William Patry220 with
mechanical precision: (1) The statute is primarily copyright-like;221
(2) the Copyright Clause contains the limitations of duration222 and
fixation;223 (3) the statute is inconsistent with both of these
limits;224 (4) therefore, Congress may not use the Commerce
Clause to bypass the Copyright Clause;225 and (5) the statute is
unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause.226
The Martignon court’s insistence on classifying the statute
based on its purpose is now clear. If the clause may be classified
as “copyright-like” then it is categorically confined to Congress’
216

Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(e)(1) (2000)) (“[T]he
terms ‘copy’, ‘fixed’, ‘musical work’, ‘phonorecord’, ‘reproduce’, ‘sound recordings’,
and ‘transmit’ mean those terms within the meaning of title 17.”).
217
Id. at 420–22 (emphasis added).
218
Id. at 423–24.
219
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982); see U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8 (conferring all of Congress’ enumerated powers).
220
See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425 n.16. See generally Patry, supra note 106.
221
See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.
222
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (establishing a
basic copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years).
223
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188
U.S. 239 (1903).
224
See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422–24 (Part II.C: “Sustainability of the AntiBootlegging Statute Under the Copyright Clause”).
225
See id. at 424–29 (Part II.D: “When Copyright Clause Power Conflicts With
Commerce Clause Power”).
226
Id.
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copyright authority, and as such, the anti-bootlegging statute may
not be sustained under alternative authority.227
The Martignon holding echoes the holding in Gibbons:
[W]hen Congress enacts copyright or copyright-like
legislation, for the purpose stated in the Copyright Clause,
it is constrained by the Copyright Clause’s boundaries.
Finding otherwise, as cautioned by Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, would grant Congress the ability “to repeal the
[fixation and durational] requirement[s]” of Art. I, § 8 cl. 8
of the constitution.228
Thus, the Martignon court applied Gibbons as a model and
reached the same result. Express limits on one of Congress’
enumerated powers impliedly limit Congressional discretion to
legislate under another.
B. KISS Catalog v. Passport International Productions, Inc.
Only three months after the Southern District of New York
entered its Opinion and Order in Martignon, the Central District of
California entered its Opinion and Order229 in KISS Catalog,230
reaching a similar result based on the same rationale.
1. Facts
On July 10, 1976, KISS231 performed at New Jersey’s
Roosevelt Stadium as part of its “Spirit of ‘76” tour.232 The
227
See id. at 426 n.17 (“Congress is not bound by the Copyright Clause’s limitations
when it legislates in an unrelated field and enacts legislation for a purpose other than the
one embodied in the Copyright Clause. However, when Congress enacts copyright or
copyright-like legislation, for the purpose stated in the Copyright Clause, it is constrained
by the Copyright Clause’s boundaries.”).
228
Id. at 426 (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468–69).
229
The Martignon Order was entered on Sept. 24, 2004 and KISS Catalog on Dec. 21,
2004.
230
Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
231
KISS is a New York City-based band that became famous in the mid-1970s and is
attributed with inventing much of the musical genre “heavy metal.” The band is known
for its elaborate stage shows, loud music, and extravagant costumes. See KISS, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KISS_%28band%29 (last visited Apr. 11, 2005). See
generally GENE SIMMONS, KISS AND MAKE-UP (2001).
232
See KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
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concert promoter, Metropolitan Talent, Inc., (Metropolitan)
arranged for three camera video coverage of the concert for
simultaneous projection behind the performers.233 The video-feed
was also recorded onto videotape.234 Thirty years later, in June
2003, Metropolitan’s agent licensed “the long-forgotten Roosevelt
Concert footage” to the defendant, Passport International
Productions, Inc. (Passport).235 Passport began to sell the video, in
DVD format, in October 2003 as KISS: The Lost Concert.236
In November 2003, the plaintiffs, Kiss Catalog and founding
band members/songwriters Gene Klein (a.k.a. Gene Simmons) and
Paul Stanley, filed a variety of trademark and state law claims.237
The court issued a preliminary injunction against continued sales
that was reversed by the Ninth Circuit.238 In August 2004, the
plaintiffs added a claim of distributing bootleg recordings in
violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), which creates a cause of
action against distributors of bootleg recordings.239 In October
2004, the plaintiffs added a copyright infringement claim based on
a statement by Metropolitan’s CEO which averred that the footage
was a work-for-hire and KISS was the rightful copyright owner.240
Based on the copyright infringement claim, the court issued a
preliminary injunction against sales on November 8, 2004.241 On
December 21, 2004, the court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the anti-bootlegging claim, finding that 17 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3) was unconstitutional because it violated the “limited
Times” requirement of the Copyright Clause.242

233

Id.
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id. As of April 11, 2005, this DVD was still available, among other places, at
http://www.mvc.co.uk/common/product.jhtml?pid=30049846.
237
See KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 825. KISS Catalog is the holder of KISS
trademarks. Id.
238
KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 108 Fed. Appx. 525 (9th Cir. 2004).
239
See KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 833 (“Since the Court cannot include a limited term of its own accord, the
Court holds that the current version of the statute creates perpetual copyright-like
protection in violation of the ‘for limited Times’ restriction of the Copyright Clause.”).
234
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2. Summary of the KISS Catalog Opinion
The court first noted that although the civil anti-bootlegging
statute had been in existence for a decade, the issue was a matter of
first impression for the courts.243
The court held that § 1101(a)(3) unconstitutionally extends
perpetual protection against the distribution of bootleg phonograms
or copies of a performance.244 In the case at bar, the protection
was invoked for an act of distribution that took place twenty-eight
years after the original recording had been made.245 The court
found that the plain language of the statute246 did not establish a
durational limit, but applied to any distribution of unauthorized
recordings, regardless of when it was originally fixed.247 The court
also held that, although § 1101 was codified within title 17, the
Copyright Act’s own limits on duration did not apply.248 Congress
had specifically incorporated the remedies found in 17 U.S.C. §§
502–05; therefore it was “reasonable to conclude that Congress
included as much existing copyright law [within § 1101] as it
intended.”249
Citing the Martignon analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, the court
found the anti-bootlegging statutes to be copyright-like,250 and
therefore, in violation of the “limited Times” requirement of the

243

Id. at 828.
Having found that the civil anti-bootlegging statute is a copyright-like statute the
court next considered whether it was constitutional under the Copyright Clause. Id. at
831–32. Referencing the Moghadam court’s discussion of the scope of the fixation
requirement, the KISS court, like the Moghadam court five years earlier, stopped short of
deciding the issue. Id. (citing United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1274, 1274 (11th Cir.
1999)). The court found fixation to be a close question because in a § 1101(a)(3) claim
the bootlegged recording may, itself, satisfy the requirement. Id. at 832.
245
See id. at 825 (KISS performed the concert on July 10, 1976, while the defendants
began selling the video in October 2003).
246
17 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (2000) (“This section shall apply to any act or acts that occur on
or after the date of the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.”). The “Lost
Concert” recording took place in 1976, eighteen years before the anti-bootlegging statutes
were enacted. KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
247
KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
248
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)).
249
Id. at 833.
250
Id. at 830.
244
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Copyright Clause.251 As in Moghadam and Martignon before it,
the court then considered whether the Commerce Clause could
provide alternative authority for the statute by placing Gibbons in
the balance with The Trade Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel,
and Authors League.252 Like the Martignon court, the KISS
Catalog court found Gibbons to be on point.253 The Gibbons Court
had examined a clause, “like the Copyright Clause, that both
provides a positive grant of power and contains an express
limit.”254 In the instant case, allowing Congress to invoke the
Commerce Clause in a situation where the Copyright Clause would
otherwise be violated would “eradicate from the Constitution a
limitation on the power of Congress.”255
III. KISS CATALOG AND MARTIGNON ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the district courts’ formalist rationale and
suggests that questions of implied limits on Congress’ legislative
authority require a functional analysis. Both courts applied the
template laid-out in Gibbons categorically, i.e. without alteration
or adjustment. This results not only in the wrong conclusion in
KISS Catalog and Martignon but in a sweeping precedent that
would be highly debilitating to Congress’ ability to regulate the
information economy.
Part A distinguishes Gibbons and finds that the courts failed to
consider significant differences between the statutes and
constitutional clauses involved. Part B distinguishes William
Patry’s “negative rights” hypothesis from the matter before the
district courts. Part C suggests that imposing implied limits upon
Congress’ legislative authority requires a functional, not a
categorical approach and advocates for an inquiry that asks
whether the anti-bootlegging statutes are incongruous with the
Commerce Clause or interfere with the Copyright Clause. Parts D
251

Id.
Id. at 834.
253
Id. at 836.
254
Id. at 836–37.
255
Id. at 836 (citing Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469
(1982)).
252
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and E inquire whether the anti-bootlegging statutes actually
conflict with the “Writings” and “limited Times” requirements of
the Copyright Clause.
A. The Quasi-Copyright Nature of the Statutes: Distinguishing
Gibbons
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit,256 the Southern District of New
York and Central District of California find convincing congruence
between the uniformity requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause and
the limitations of the Copyright Clause. The Martignon opinion is
modeled closely on Railway Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,257 and
both district court opinions rely on the case.258 However, the
district courts did not consider a number of distinguishing points
between Gibbons and the present case: the absence of a state
sovereignty interest, the absence of a distinct textual implication of
external effect, and the circumscribed scope of the statute’s
protection. The district courts simply applied Gibbons as a blanket
rule, an overly broad approach that unnecessarily hinders
Congress’ ability to legislate within the grant of its enumerated
powers.
1. Differences between the Statutes
The Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance
Act (RITA) at issue in Gibbons was found by the Court to be an
actual bankruptcy law, not a bankruptcy-like law: the Act applied
to an ongoing proceeding in bankruptcy court, reordered the
priority of creditors’ claims, and required the bankruptcy court to
implement the final arrangements.259 RITA’s legislative history

256

See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part I.D.
258
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating
that it is “essential to determine how to classify a statute in order to ensure that it does not
run afoul of any express limitations imposed on Congress when regulating in the
respective arena”) (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 467); KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at
823 (“Like the Martignon court, this Court finds [Gibbons] to be the most instructive
case on this issue.”).
259
Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 467–68.
257
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also revealed that “Congress wanted to make liquidation of a
railroad costly for the estate.”260
In contrast to RITA, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is, at most, a quasicopyright statute.261
The statute affords substantially less
protection than copyright protection, vesting only the exclusive
right to record or broadcast a live performance in the
performers.262
Any other form of copying, including the
subsequent performance of the identical work by an unauthorized
performer, or copying of the actual notes performed, is not
addressed by the statute.263
The Martignon court does not consider the statute’s minimal
scope.264 Instead, the court cites evidence of Congress’ intent as
proof that the statute is primarily copyright-like.265 This evidence
is ambiguous at best. The Martignon court’s emphasis on TRIPs’
“IP” (Intellectual Property) aspect266 only contrasts with the
Moghadam court’s focus on its “TR” (Trade-Related) aspect.267
The confluence of international trade and intellectual property
260

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The
rights created by the anti-bootlegging provisions . . . are actually hybrid rights that in
some ways resemble the protections of copyright law but in other ways are distinct from
them.”).
262
Compare supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text with notes 209–14 and
accompanying text. In contrast, copyright prevents any substantial copying and grants
multiple rights to exclude in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
263
Of course, in the case of a performance of contemporary music, the underlying
musical composition will often be protected by copyright, in which case, transcription of
the composition and subsequent performance, although permitted by the anti-bootlegging
statutes, would violate the Copyright Act’s reproduction and public performance rights.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106. However, performances of musical compositions that have fallen
into the public domain, such as of Mozart, or improvisational or other works that have
not been fixed in a tangible medium of expression, may be transcribed, performed, and
distributed unhindered by the anti-bootlegging statutes, which only protect against
simultaneously produced recordings and transmissions. See supra note 8.
264
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
265
Id.
266
Id. at 420 (stating TRIPs “dealt completely with intellectual property”).
267
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (“The specific context in which § 2319A was enacted
involved a treaty with foreign nations, called for by the World Trade Organization, whose
purpose was to ensure uniform recognition and treatment of intellectual property in
international commerce. The context reveals that the focus of Congress was on interstate
and international commerce.”) (emphasis added).
261
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interests only underscores the difficulty of characterizing the
statute as primarily embodying the values of either the Commerce
or the Copyright Clauses. The fact that the Committee on the
Judiciary divided the TRIPs chapter of the Senate Report into the
three-part division of copyright, patent, and trademark is also less
than helpful.268 The protection of live musical performances from
bootleggers is undoubtedly more similar to a copyright than a
trademark or a patent. While it would have been more accurate to
provide a fourth subheading “Sui Generis Provisions,” the bare
five-sentence description of both statutes in the report attests to the
cursory consideration given to its drafting.269
Both courts’ arguments for a copyright-like status based on
statutory placement is undermined by Authors League of America,
Inc. v. Oman,270 in which the Second Circuit held that the
Manufacturing Clause,271 codified in Section 601 of the Copyright
Act, was justified not by the Copyright Clause, but by the
Commerce Clause.272 Had Congress intended live performance to
become a protected subject matter under the Copyright Act it
would have amended § 102(a) as it has done repeatedly in the
past.273
Instead, Congress created a new Chapter 11 to
accommodate the civil statute. Similarly, Congress could have
amended 18 U.S.C. § 2319, the umbrella criminal infringement
statute for all copyrightable subject matter, to include criminal
infringement of live performances. Instead, Congress opted to
268

See id.; see also supra note 34. The anti-bootlegging statutes implement Article 14
of TRIPs which comes under the subheading of “Copyright and Related Rights.” See
supra note 8.
269
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 8E.05[A] (“In the context of Chapter 11 [of
Title 17], the question arises how Congress viewed its enactment authority. There is no
answer. Chapter 11 itself offers no clue as to how it might pass constitutional muster.
The legislative history, Statement of Administrative Action, and floor statements are
similarly bereft of support.”).
270
See Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986); see also
supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
271
17 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
272
See Authors League, 790 F.2d at 224 (finding that the Manufacturing Clause was
“clearly justified as an exercise of the legislature’s power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations”); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
273
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2000). Architectural works were added as copyrightable
subject matter in 1990. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 703,
104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
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enact a separate statute, distinct from a claim of copyright
infringement.274 Finally, while it is true that the phrase “for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain”
appears in both the criminal infringement and anti-bootlegging
statutes, the phrase also appears in a criminal statute regarding
“fraud and related activity in connection with computers,” a title
18 statute that was enacted under Congress’ Commerce Clause
powers.275 In Moghadam, the court cites the phrase as evidence
that the statute was, indeed, of and concerning commerce.276
The Martignon court recites this ambiguous evidence of
Congressional intent after agreeing with the Moghadam court that
“Congress’ belief as to the power under which it enacts a statute is
not dispositive.”277 At most, the court’s rationale illustrates that
the statute is, as the Moghadam court had found it, a somewhat
copyright-like statute.
2. Differences between the Clauses
Chief Justice Rehnquist observes that the text of the
Bankruptcy Clause was drafted specifically contemplating statutes
of the very kind faced by the Court in that case.278 The word
“uniform” loses much of its meaning if inapplicable to alternative
sources of legislation.279 The same cannot be said for the text of
the Copyright Clause. There is no indication that the terms
“Writings” and “limited Times” were intended to or must apply to
any matter beyond the implementation of the grant itself.280
274

See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
276
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999) (“If
bootlegging is done for financial gain, it necessarily is intertwined with commerce.”).
277
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also
Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (“The
question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals
of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”) (citing Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)).
278
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982).
279
See id. (“Although the debate in the Constitutional Convention regarding the
Bankruptcy Clause was meager, we think it lends some support to our conclusion that the
uniformity requirement of the Clause prohibits Congress from enacting bankruptcy laws
that [in this case] specifically apply to the affairs of only one named debtor.”).
280
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
275
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The Gibbons court emphasized that the Bankruptcy Clause was
hotly debated during the Constitutional Convention because it
involved a question of State sovereignty.281 The uniformity
requirement was, in part, a response to some States’ practice of
enacting private bills which rendered uniformity impossible.282
Congressional meddling in particular bankruptcy proceedings is no
less prone to legislative abuse and may be equally prejudicial to
the interests of certain States.283
In contrast, the Copyright Clause was passed by committee
with little debate, reflecting a weak linkage to State sovereignty
issues.284 During the centuries following the Constitutional
Convention, federal copyright law progressively preempted most
of common-law copyright with little protest from the States.285
The absence of a strong State sovereignty component286
undermines the view that the commerce power is restricted in this
matter. State sovereignty concerns are further assuaged by §
1101(d), which preserves all State protection of live performances
281

Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 472.
Id.
283
See id.
284
See Nachbar, supra note 18, at 338 (“There was very little discussion of the
Intellectual Property Clause among the Framers; there is no record of any debate over it
at the Federal Convention.”); Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109, 114 (1929) (“The matter, on its merits,
apparently aroused substantially no controversy either in the Convention or among the
States adopting the Constitution.”).
285
The Copyright Act of 1790 protected maps, charts and books for a maximum of two
fourteen-year terms. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. The 1909 Act doubled
the term of protection and encompassed “all the writings of an author” from the moment
of publication, while common law copyright continued to protect all unpublished works.
See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1076 (repealed 1976). The Copyright
Act of 1976 extended the term to life of the author plus fifty years and protected, from the
moment of creation, all original works of an author fixed in tangible medium of
expression under seven broad categories of subject matter. See Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a) (1998)).
286
See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 33, 59 (2003) (stating that the “exercise of the copyright
power does not in any way impinge on the authority of the States.”). But see NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 52, § 8E.01[B] (“The federalization of control over unfixed
productions departs from several centuries of American jurisprudence, given that
regulation of activities lacking fixation has traditionally been the realm of state law
protection. In th[is] sense, . . . chapter [11] represents a . . . departure from Constitutional
moorings . . . .”).
282
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from preemption.287 The few Commerce Clause statutes that have
been struck down by the Court since the Lochner era have each
touched upon areas of traditional State control, such as
education288 and health and safety.289 In such cases, the Court has
applied a heightened form of rational basis review in order to
safeguard the States from federal overreaching. Since federalism
is not strongly implicated in copyright issues, this form of close
scrutiny should not apply.290 Also, copyright is a field rife with
economic policy, well-suited to the processes of representative
government and ill-suited to the processes of the courtroom.291
Therefore, deference is due to Congressional decision-making and
the courts should apply a “minimal rational basis” of review.292
In sum, the absence of a strong state sovereignty interest, the
absence of a textual implication of external effect, and the
circumscribed scope of the statutes’ effect sufficiently distinguish
Gibbons from the present case so as to warrant a reasoned analysis
not a categorical application of its result.
B. Distinguishing William Patry’s Structural Analysis
The Martignon court also misapplies William Patry’s structural
analysis, which contemplates only the originality requirement.293
Interpreting Bonito Boats, Feist, and Gibbons, William Patry
predicted that if Congress tried to protect databases of unoriginal
facts, the Court would strike it down as an end run around the
287

17 U.S.C. § 1101(d) (2000).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see supra notes 133–34 and
accompanying text.
289
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see supra note 135 and accompanying
text.
290
See Nachbar, supra note 286, at 59 (“While vigilant judicial review in the federalism
context is a response to the possibility that Congress has taken power from the States,
thereby altering the balance of power so carefully established by the Constitution, the
exercise of the copyright power presents no similarly fundamental danger to the
constitutional order because exercise of the copyright power does not in any way impinge
on the authority of the States.”).
291
Id. at 34.
292
Id. at 68–70 (“[T]he Court applies the lower conceivable basis standard when it is
satisfied that the sovereign in question does indeed have plenary power in the area being
regulated.”).
293
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
288

DANITZ

1186

11/21/2005 1:11 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XV

Copyright Clause.294 The Martignon court’s extension of this
reasoning to the “fixation requirement” is unsound.295 Patry
concluded that in Feist, the Court demarcated the boundary
between the Copyright Clause and other enumerated powers, and
that this boundary-line is the originality requirement: the locus of
the “negative right”/“positive right” divide .296
This structural analysis, focusing on the originality
requirement, supports the validity of the federal anti-bootlegging
statute. Live musical performances are original works. Every
performance is a new experience for audience and performer. The
protection extended by the anti-bootlegging statutes does not
remove the building blocks of creativity from the public domain.
To the contrary, each performance disseminates the ideas and facts
embodied in the work and the statute places no restraint on the reuse of those building blocks. Indeed, the statute places no restraint
on the verbatim copying of the live performance.297 The statute
simply grants the performers the sole right to record or transmit the
performance.298 This circumscribed protection furthers the goal of
the Copyright Clause by encouraging the production of new ideas
and discoveries which are, in turn, given over to the public without
encumbrance. The protection of live musical performances by the
enactment of anti-bootlegging statutes, therefore, is supported by
William Patry’s structural analysis.299
C. Implied Limits Require a Functional Rather than a Categorical
Approach
After placing the statute in the “copyright” box, both the
Martignon and the KISS Catalog courts simply conclude that the
294

See Patry, supra note 106, at 398.
See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413.
296
See Patry, supra note 106, at 384 (“In Feist, the Court made clear that originality is
the dividing line of Congress’s enumerated power.”).
297
See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000).
298
See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000).
299
If the absence of a fixed form triggers any concern at all it is regarding the scope of
the dissemination. Unless it is broadcast, live performance is accessible to only a limited
number of persons. However, that concern is ameliorated by the rather circumscribed
scope of the protection. The performance may be mimicked and otherwise copied after
the performance without violating the statute. See infra note 323.
295
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Commerce Clause may not authorize the statute. This is a
categorical approach to a matter of public policy in which
deference to Congress is appropriate. In analogous circumstances,
the Court has tended to utilize a functional and structural approach
that weighs the actual effect of potential conflicts between
Constitutional grants of authority.
In considering the non-delegation doctrine, the Rehnquist
Court has taken a functional/structural approach—asking whether
the delegation at issue is incongruous and whether it actually
interferes with the functioning of the neighboring power. For
example, in Morrison v Olson300 the Supreme Court upheld the
limited role of the executive in appointing and removing the
Independent Counsel based on a pragmatic analysis that diverged
from formalist precedent.301 In Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for the Court, found that Congress’ delegation of the
power to appoint the Independent Counsel to the courts was not
incongruent with functions normally performed by courts and
therefore did not run afoul of Constitutional limits on inter-branch
appointments.302 Regarding the imposition of a “good cause”
provision for removal by the executive, the Court stated that the
real question is whether the President’s ability to perform his duty
is impeded.303 Finding that the “good cause” provision did not
“unduly trammel[] on executive authority”304 and did not “pose a
dange[r] of Congressional usurpation” of executive power,305 the
Court upheld the delegation.306
The enumerated powers issue posed by 18 U.S.C. § 2319A and
17 U.S.C. § 1101 parallels the inter-branch delegation cases, and,
as in the delegation cases, the inquiry should be a pragmatic one.
Is the statute incongruous with the commerce power? Does the
300

487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 689–90.
302
Id. at 677.
303
Id. at 691 (“But the real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a
nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the
functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light.”).
304
Id.
305
Id. at 694 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 714, 727
(1983)).
306
Id. at 691–92.
301
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statute actually interfere with the copyright power? This is
essentially the approach taken, albeit with spare analysis, by the
Moghadam court.
If the finding that the anti-bootlegging statute is “copyrightlike” is accepted, then the question parallels one of delegation
between constitutional powers. In Morrison, the transfer of
authority took place between the Articles of the Constitution.307 In
Martignon, the transfer of authority occurs between Clauses within
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.308 The portion of a quasicopyright statute that is “copyright-like” must not pose a danger of
undermining the place of the Copyright Clause in the
Constitutional scheme and “may not . . . set at naught” the benefits
contemplated by the Clause.309 This is a matter of hybrid
authority. Power sharing between Article I, Section 8 clauses
should receive more solicitude upon judicial review than power
sharing between branches of government that involves interArticle delegations of authority because there is no equivalent to
the Necessary and Proper clause on the inter-branch level.310 Also,
the Court makes clear in Bonito Boats that Congress is vested with
great discretion to shape the contours of the rights generated by the
Intellectual Property Clause.311 The balance is Congress’ to
strike.312 This is amply illustrated in the afterward to Bonito Boats
in which Congress responded to the Court’s decision by extending
307

The Independent Counsel is an executive officer; executive officers are typically
appointed and removed by the President pursuant to his Article I powers. Id. at 657–60.
Congress, authorized by its Article II powers, delegated the authority to appoint the
Independent Counsel to the Special Division of the D.C. Circuit Court, an Article III
court. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 (1978). The Act also
restricted removal by the President by requiring a showing of “good cause.” See id.
308
346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
309
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (quoting Sola Elec. Co.
v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
310
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”).
311
See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989).
312
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (“Bonito Boats reiterated the
Court’s unclouded understanding: ‘It is for Congress to determine if the present system’
effectuates the goals of the Copyright and Patent Clause.’”) (citing Bonito Boats, 489
U.S. at 168).
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sui generis copyright-like protection to vessel hull designs within
Title V of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act313 and codified in
a new chapter 13 of the Copyright Act itself.
In sum, the district courts’ rationale is flawed because it applies
the result of the Court’s analysis in Gibbons and the result of
William Patry’s analysis as a bright-line and blanket rule.
Invalidation of a duly enacted federal law based on an implied
limit on Congress’ powers should be premised on a finding of
actual interference with the copyright power or with a larger
“constitutional norm.” In the instant case, the structural concerns
addressed in Feist and Gibbons are not present and, as we shall
discuss in greater detail below, there is no actual conflict between
the anti-bootlegging statutes and the Copyright Clause. Therefore,
the Circuit Courts should reverse the district courts and find that
the statute is a legitimate use of Congress’ commerce power.
D. No Fixation. No Problem.
The government314 and amicus briefs315 to the Second Circuit
rely on the assumption that unfixed works are inherently
inconsistent with the Copyright Clause “Writings” requirement.
These briefs argue that unfixed works, such as live performances,
are simply beyond the subject matter of copyright and therefore no
conflict arises with Commerce Clause authority.316 This is the
mirror image of the Martignon opinion. Both the district court and
the government would constitutionalize “fixation” as a bright-line
rule. Judge Baer would limit the scope of copyright’s protections
to fixed works, leaving Congress with no authority to regulate
unfixed works under the Commerce Clause. In contrast, the
government would limit the scope of copyright’s restrictions to
fixed works, giving Congress plenary authority to regulate unfixed
works under the Commerce Clause.317 Both approaches would
effect an artificial bifurcation of the federal copyright power, a
313

See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
See Martignon Brief for the U.S., supra note 27, at 16.
315
UMG Amicus Brief, supra note 27, at 13; Ass’n of Am. Publishers Amicus Brief,
supra note 27, at 21.
316
See, e.g., Martignon Brief for the U.S., supra note 27, at 16.
317
See id.
314

DANITZ

1190

11/21/2005 1:11 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XV

result that is legislatively inefficient and harmful to the
Constitutional scheme. Also, “fixation” is an increasingly murky
and metaphysical concept as information is manipulated at near
real-time through processes no more fixed than a quantum
probability or a phosphorescent glow. As a result, it can provide
only an arbitrary basis for delimiting where the copyright power
begins and ends. Ironically, the insistence on permanence may
itself place the foundations of copyright on shifting sands.
A sounder basis of decision would inquire whether the
regulation undermines the constitutional floor erected in Feist
Technological
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service.318
innovation is unlikely to erode the principles of originality or the
fact/expression and idea/expression dichotomy, as it has begun to
erode the concept of the fixation. The “Progress of Science and
the useful Arts” is promoted when new forms of expression,
including those that challenge the traditional meaning of
“Writings,” are brought within copyright’s protective mantle.319
Therefore, determining the scope of protection by asking whether a
statute functionally conflicts with the Copyright Clause would
preserve meaningful distinctions between Clauses 3 and 8, and, at
the same time, provide Congress with the flexibility it requires.
1. Live Performances May Be “Writing[s]”
A live musical performance may, in fact, be a “Writing;”
therefore it is unfortunate that the Martignon prosecutors conceded
that they are not.320 In Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
it is unclear whether “Writings” may be expanded to include live
performances which “are merely capable of fixation” and decided
the case on other grounds.321 The KISS Catalog court also decided
the case on grounds other than the “Writings” requirement, finding
it a “closer question” than the “limited Times” requirement.322
While common law copyright has recognized copyright
318

499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
320
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
321
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999).
322
KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
319
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infringement of unfixed expressions323 and California has codified
its protection of unfixed works,324 the federal copyright system has
always implicitly or explicitly required that the work be fixed in a
“tangible medium of expression.”325
However, despite
protestations by venerable commentators that construing
“Writings” to include performances is ludicrous,326 the Court has
not limited Congress’ discretion in this matter and requires no
more from a “Writing” than an original expression that is made by
an “Author.”327
The Framers lived in a world dominated by the quill and the
printing press. Even these prescient drafters could not have
envisioned camcorders, DATs, eyeglass-cams, mini-mics, and a
battery of other miniaturized and affordable means of surreptitious
reproduction, in simulacra, of a live work. Neither would the
progenitors of American copyright protection have conceived of a
network of peer-to-peer and file transfer protocols in which clones
323
See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 349 (1968)
(“Assuming, without deciding, that in a proper case a common-law copyright in certain
limited kinds of spoken dialogue might be recognized, it would, at the very least, be
required that the speaker indicate that he intended to mark off the utterance in question
from the ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique statement and
that he wished to exercise control over its publication.”); see also Falwell v. Penthouse
Int’l, 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981) (finding oral interview does not come within
narrow circumstances that can sustain a common law copyright cause of action).
324
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 980(a)(1) (1982).
The author of any original work of authorship that is not fixed in any tangible
medium of expression has an exclusive ownership in the representation or
expression thereof as against all persons except one who originally and
independently creates the same or similar work. A work shall be considered
not fixed when it is not embodied in a tangible medium of expression or when
its embodiment in a tangible medium of expression is not sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.
Id.
325
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666
(“Two essential elements––original work and tangible object––must merge through
fixation in order to produce subject matter copyrightable under the statute.”).
326
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 1.08[C][2] (“If the word ‘writings’ is to be
given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote some material form,
capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endurance.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
327
See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
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of such recorded works are exported globally in a matter of
minutes.
It is entirely plausible that the living document of the U.S.
Constitution does not exclude protection of certain live works
within the broad grant of discretion the Copyright Clause vests in
Congress.
In this scenario, the Copyright Act’s fixation
requirement functions as an evidentiary and administrative
measure applicable to the bulk of protected subject matter, and sui
generis protection of original but unfixed works, while outside the
Copyright Act itself, is within the scope of the copyright power.328
As noted by the Moghadam court, Congress’ protection of live
broadcasts through the legal fiction329 of simultaneous recording
illustrates that the fixation requirement is a flexible standard;
therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is more in the nature of “an
incremental change than a constitutional breakthrough.”330
Recognizing that the Copyright Clause is broader than the
Copyright Act, the courts should not force Congress to legislate by
legal fiction, but should recognize that the Constitution’s interest in
the progress of the useful arts is promoted when live performances
are protected.
2. Protecting Live Performances Does Not Conflict with the
Copyright Clause
Even if the term “Writings” is construed as excluding live
musical performances, there is no inherent conflict between the
protection of fixed works under the Copyright Clause and sui
generis protection of live performances under the Commerce
Clause. Such protections provide incentives to performing artists
to produce live works that disseminate the ideas and facts
328

See CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007
(1967) (“[W]hile more precise limitations on ‘writings’ might be convenient in
connection with a statutory scheme of registration and notice, we see no reason why
Congress’ power is so limited.”).
329
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are
being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being
made simultaneously with its transmission.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
330
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999).
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embodied within to their audience. While fixation enlarges the
scope of dissemination, in both time and space, it does not change
the “essential” benefit gained by the public. Therefore the antibootlegging statutes are consistent with the goals of copyright as
delineated in Feist and do not undermine the Congressional
scheme enacted to give effect to the Copyright Clause.
3. “Proto-Copyright” Protection
Protection of original works that are poised to be fixed is a
distinct species of quasi-copyright that this Comment shall label
“proto-copyright.”331
Proto-copyright statutes protect live,
streaming, transmitted, and RAM-cached works that are the
unfixed precursors to wholly copyrightable expressions.332 Protocopyright protection promotes the progress of science and the
useful arts by encouraging performances that in turn may be fixed
in a copyrightable form to be determined by the author(s). Where
a proto-copyright protection guards, as it does in the instant case,
only against reproduction of a work by means of a recording, and
only for the duration of a performance, such protection is
consistent with the Copyright Clause because it does not create an
ongoing monopoly interest in a particular work.333 Quasicopyright is a broader genus of protection encompassing both
proto-copyright and copyright-like protection of works that would
not be protectable under the Copyright Clause itself if fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. Protection of unoriginal databases
is one such proposed quasi-copyright statute and is distinct from
the proto-copyright statute at issue in the instant case.334 Thus, the

331

See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000)
(defining proto as “1. First in time, earliest . . . 2. First formed; primitive . . . .”), available
at http://www.bartleby.com/61/62/P0616200.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
332
The legal fiction protecting live transmissions that are simultaneously recorded is
another example of proto-copyright protection. See supra note 336.
333
See infra notes 336–63 and accompanying text.
334
See Alan J. Hartnick, Do Proposed Database Laws Protect Information Rather than
Investment?, 14(2) N.Y. ST. B.A. ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 61 (2003) (“If there is a new
law, to avoid controversy, it will need to be narrowly drafted.”); see also Patry, supra
note 106. Contra Nachbar, supra note 18, at 274.
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anti-bootlegging statutes are not unconstitutional simply because
they are not yet “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”335
E. The Statutes Do Not Conflict with the “limited Times”
Requirement
The Martignon decision’s alternative ground—that even if
Congress may enact copyright-like statutes under the Commerce
Clause, the anti-bootlegging statute is ‘fundamentally inconsistent’
with the Copyright Clause because it lacks a durational limit—
rests on the false premise that “limited Times” for purposes of
copyright and patent protection is equivalent. Drawing upon
precedents from patent law, the court ignores the Court’s lesson in
Eldred v. Ashcroft336 that “limited Times” operates differently in
copyright than patent law because 1) copyright is not a true
monopoly and 2) public disclosure is a goal but not a requirement
of copyright. The result of this confusion is an expansive and
overly rigid version of the “limited Times” requirement as applied
to copyright generally and to a proto-copyright statute, such as the
anti-bootlegging statutes, particularly.337 Because “limited Times”
acts as an antidote to monopoly, where such concerns are absent
the requirement should by not be applied. However, the antibootlegging statutes at issue do not violate even the expansive
version of the “limited Times” requirement espoused by the district
courts because live performances are of intrinsically finite
duration.

335

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
337
Although the Court has, in certain cases, analogized to patent law, recognizing “the
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law,” it has also emphasized that “[t]he
two areas of the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution which
we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other.”
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19. In Eldred,
the Court squarely states that durational limits is one area where fruitful analogies
between patent and copyright may not be drawn. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217.
336
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1. The “limited Times” Requirement Applies Differently to
Patents and Copyrights
The Martignon court provides only a brief explanation for its
conclusion that the lack of a durational limitation is fundamentally
inconsistent with the Copyright Clause. Citing P.C. Films Corp. v.
Turner Entertainment Co.,338 the court stated that “[t]he ‘Limited
Times’ requirement offsets [an author’s] monopoly and ensures
that the public will benefit, albeit at a later date, when the work
reaches the public domain.”339
This rationale is based on false premises stemming from a
confusion of patent and copyright. This confusion is borne out by
the passage in P.C. Films referenced by the court: “The public has
invested in such free use by the grant of a monopoly to the
patentee for a limited time. Hence any attempted reservation or
continuation . . . of the patent monopoly, after the patent
expires . . . runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent
laws.”340 For this passage, P.C. Films references the Court’s
decisions in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.341 and
Brulotte v. Thys Company,342 both of which decided questions of
patent law.343
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court stated that the copyright and
patent systems effectuate the Intellectual Property Clause in
distinct ways and courts should be wary of applying the analysis of
patents cases to copyright cases, especially when analyzing
questions of duration.344 The reason for this caution is two-fold: 1)
copyright is not a true monopoly and 2) disclosure is not required
by copyright, but is the quid pro quo of patent protection.

338
P.C. Films Corp. v. Turner Entm’t Co., 954 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (deciding
the effect of a copyright renewal upon a perpetual license under the 1909 Act).
339
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing P.C.
Films Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 715 (citations omitted)).
340
P.C. Films Corp, 954 F. Supp. at 715.
341
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
342
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), reh’g denied, 79 U.S. 985 (1965).
343
P.C. Films, 954 F. Supp. at 715.
344
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (“[P]atents and copyrights do not
entail the same exchange, and . . . our references to a quid pro quo typically appear in the
patent context.”).
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a) Copyright Is Not a True Monopoly
As noted by Justice Ginsberg, speaking for the Court, in
Eldred:
Distinguishing the two kinds of intellectual property,
copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge.
A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any
fact or idea she acquires from her reading. . . . The grant of
a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by others
of the inventor’s knowledge.345
Copyright only grants protection to a particular expression.346
This protection also falls short of being a true monopoly because,
unlike patent, copyright does not require novelty:347 in copyright,
an independently created work that is identical to a pre-existing
work, does not infringe that pre-existing identical work.348
Therefore, while the “limited Times” requirement offsets the
patent monopoly, it does not function in the same way in the
copyright context.
b) Disclosure is Not Required by Copyright, but Is the
Quid Pro Quo of Patent Protection
Since the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, publication
is no longer a prerequisite of copyright protection.349 This
underscores a basic distinction between copyright and patent.
While a patent acts very much like a contract, with consideration
on both sides of the bargain, copyright acts more as an incentives
scheme that does not require disclosure as quid pro quo. Justice
Ginsberg highlights this distinction in Eldred:

345

See id. at 217.
See generally SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 64, § 16.1.
347
Id.
348
See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“Borrowed
the work must not indeed be . . . ; but if by some magic a man who had never known it
were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he
copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy
Keats’s [since Keats’s work is now in the public domain].”)
349
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, § 301, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5745.
346
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[I]mmediate disclosure is not the objective of, but is
exacted from, the patentee. It is the price paid for the
exclusivity secured . . . . For the author seeking copyright
protection, in contrast, disclosure is the desired objective,
not something exacted from the author in exchange for the
copyright.350
The Court’s statement that “limited Times” requires a different
analysis in patent than in copyright applies with even more force in
the case of proto-copyright statutes, such as 17 U.S.C. § 1101 and
18 U.S.C. § 2319A, which provide for only minimal copyright-like
protections.351
c) “limited Times” is Required Only as an Antidote to
Monopoly
In Feist and Bonito Boats, the Court raised the concern that, in
promoting the progress of science and the arts, Congress should
not lock-up the “building blocks” of creativity, as this would
undermine that goal.352 With patents, the law permits knowledge
to be monopolized for a limited time on the condition that it is
fully disclosed in executable detail to the public.353 This “quid pro
quo” acts as a sort of “idea pump” permitting 20 years of
monopoly profits to come in, in return for subsequent free access
by the public forever.
In copyright, the scheme less resembles a contract with full
consideration on either side than it does an incentives scheme.
This is because ideas cannot be protected under copyright and to
the extent that an expression is an idea, it may be utilized under the

350

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216.
The anti-bootlegging statutes protect only against unauthorized recordings and
transmissions, and only during the course of a live musical event. In contrast, copyright
protects the copyright holder from any form of copying for the entire term of protection,
as well as against subsequent performances, and adaptations. See supra note 8. Similarly,
there is no equivalent to the Copyright Act’s broad distribution right in the antibootlegging statute. See infra notes 362–63 and accompanying text.
352
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); see also Feist
Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).
353
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224.
351
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“fair use” exception.354 Thus, the moment a copyrightable subject
is published the idea(s) and facts embedded within the expression
flow freely to the public.355 As articulated in Feist, this is the
primary benefit and the “essence of copyright.”356 This benefit is
achieved through the ex-ante economic encouragement of the
author to produce and publish the work.357 This primary benefit,
of entry of fact and idea into the public domain, accrues
immediately upon publication.
A secondary public benefit of copyright, not addressed in Feist,
is economic and affects the scope of the dissemination. When a
copyright term expires and a work enters the public domain, the
author’s partial monopoly premium ends and less expensive copies
may be published by competitors. However, in a mass market, the
profit-maximizing prices for copyrighted works during the term of
protection will often not significantly exceed those of public
domain works. As a result, the democratic implications of
copyright are not distressing. Therefore, the Intellectual Property
Clause “limited Times” requirement is less “essential” with respect
to copyrights than to patents, in which it operates as a quid pro
quo. The role of the “limited Times” requirement is further
attenuated in the case of a proto-copyright protection, such as the
anti-bootlegging statutes, in which monopoly plays virtually no
part.358
2. The Anti-Bootlegging Statutes Meet the “limited Times”
Requirement
The anti-bootlegging statutes are consistent with the Copyright
Clause requirement that protections be granted only for “limited
Times”359 because a live performance is inherently limited in
duration. The statutes vest performers with a right to exclude
354

See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
356
Id. at 349 (citing Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589
(1985)).
357
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
358
See supra note 351.
359
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (establishing a
basic term of life of the author plus 70 years).
355
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others from recording or transmitting their performance for the
duration of the performance.360 When the lights fade-out and the
curtains fall, the show is over. As it is the performance itself that
is the subject matter of protection, not the bootleg recording, it is
difficult to see how the statute fails the “limited Times”
requirement.361
Unlike the copyright distribution right,362 17 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(3) (“Section (a)(3)”) restricts
the distribution of a work that no longer exists. Therefore, that
section does not grant an exclusive right of distribution of a work
at all. The bootleg recording is the fruit of the initial illegal act of
making the unauthorized recording and therefore subject to
injunction. Since no perpetual right of distribution is secured for
the performer of the live and inherently finite work, the statutes do
not violate the “limited Times” requirement of the Copyright
Clause.
This distinction is clarified by an example. In the hypothetical
case where a simultaneous recording has been made by both the
bootlegger and the performing artist, then there would be actual
interference with the artist’s distribution of her work. In this case,
Section (a)(3) would act as a form of quasi-distribution right that
would parallel the author’s right to distribute her sound recording
of the event, insofar as Section (a)(3) would eliminate competition
with the distribution of the authorized sound recording. However,
because the authorized sound recording is within the Copyright
Act, it would be subject to the durational limits of 17 U.S.C. §
302.363 When that copyright expired and the authorized sound
recording entered the public domain, the Section (a)(3) right would
lose its effect as a quasi-distribution right, since it would no longer
protect the author’s distribution interest. The distribution of the
unauthorized recording would, once again, be merely the fruit of
an illegal act and subject to injunction for that reason.

360

See supra note 8.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
362
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000 & Supp. 2002) (providing the copyright owner the
right to control the transfer of physical copies of the work).
363
See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
361
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The anti-bootlegging statutes also protect a general interest in
choosing which of a series of performances, if any, to record and
market. This protection has no equivalent under the Copyright Act
which only protects transfers of actual copies or phonograms. The
protection more closely resembles a protection of the right of
privacy as it is construed in the “right of publicity” tort. Although
such interests are present to some degree in all of copyright, they
are pervasive in a live performance, which has not yet been fixed.
The decision whether to make a recording is a threshold decision
that marks the transition between personal and public, ephemeral
and permanent. That threshold is delineated by the limits of the
Copyright Act itself. Protection of performers from a forced entry
of their work into a form that will persist in time and be widely
disseminated is consistent with fundamental notions of autonomy,
privacy and the right not to speak. Control over how the recording
is to be made similarly implicates these concerns as evinced by
Congress’ decision to make sound recordings a copyrightable
subject matter that is distinct from the underlying musical work. A
sound recording, made without authority or control by the artist is,
therefore, a misrepresentative misappropriation that is distinct from
the distribution of actual copies contemplated by § 106(3).
That the live work may not persist except for the bootleg
recording raises concerns regarding a conflict with the promotion
of the progress of science and the useful arts. Statutory authority
to destroy the only record of a live work364 is also statutory
authority to remove, in perpetuity, the “building blocks” contained
in the performance. This, however, is the very balance that
Congress is charged by the Constitution with making. Here,
Congress has granted performers the right to say which, if any,
performances are to persist in time as a record of their own
performance.
This grant encourages live performance and
dissemination of the ideas and facts contained within them.
Performing artists, such as the Grateful Dead, Dave Matthews
Band, and Phish, who choose to freely license the right to record
their performances to all attending, are free to do so. Other artists,
who prefer to determine which of their performances to fix in a
364

See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(3)(b) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).
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tangible medium of expression, and thereby enter the copyright
system, are protected in making that choice.

DANITZ

1202

11/21/2005 1:11 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XV

CONCLUSION: THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL365
The Martignon and KISS Catalog decisions mandate that any
statute protecting live performances must comply with an
expansive version of copyright’s “limited Times” and “Writings”
365

The statutes do not directly interfere with the Copyright Clause. However, they are
in tension with the Copyright Act in certain circumstances.
In the case where there is a copyright in the underlying musical composition, if the court
determines that the bootleg sound recording is a “fair use” under § 107 of the Copyright
Act, then the statute would seem to conflict with the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2004). The anti-bootlegging statute would require forfeiture, destruction of the
phonorecords, and damages or imprisonment of the bootlegger, while the Copyright Act,
pursuant to the goals of the Copyright Clause, would permit free use.
Similarly, in the case where there is no copyright in the underlying work (for instance, in
the case of an improvisation or performances of works in the public domain, such as
Mozart), the bootlegger may claim a legitimate copyright in the bootleg sound recording
itself and the statute would again seem to conflict with the Copyright Act.
These tensions are not constitutionally fatal. Copyright holders are subject to certain
limits which are, in turn, subject to First Amendment balancing upon review. For
example, federal regulation of indecency and obscenity limit a copyright holder’s ability
to make use of her exclusive right to distribute, display or perform a copyrighted work.
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 883
(1978); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Similarly, a copyright holder may be
held liable or penalized for publishing unlawfully obtained information, information that
endangers individual safety, or information that endangers national security. See, e.g.,
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (unlawfully obtained information);
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (individual safety); United
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (national security). But
see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (permitting publication
of unlawfully obtained information). Each of these restrictions is in tension with the
copyright interest in dissemination of facts and ideas to the public. However,
enforcement of such statutes is subject to ad hoc First Amendment balancing of private
and public interests, not to any test arising out of the Copyright Clause itself.
Although there is no fatal conflict between the Copyright Clause and the anti-bootlegging
statutes, a statutory amendment specifying that 17 U.S.C. § 1101 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319A
only apply to works originally recorded or transmitted after the statutes’ enactment in
1994 would increase clarity and decrease potential unfairness. Also, an amendment
admitting the “fair use” exception would be preferable to ad hoc First Amendment review
of the statute as applied. Such an amendment might read:
This act shall apply only to recordings and transmissions, as set forth in
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) respectively, taking place on or after the date of
the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and to subsequent copies
of the same. The limitation to exclusive rights set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107
shall apply to this section, although any consideration of fair use shall consider
the intention expressed herein to protect the interests of performers.
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requirements. The district courts’ categorical application of
Gibbons unnecessarily hampers Congress’ ability to shape policy
and to respond to the demands of domestic and international trade.
A functional analysis, such as has been applied by the Supreme
Court in questions of separation of powers, reveals that the antibootlegging statute does not undermine the copyright power and is
not incongruous with the commerce power. Therefore the statute
should be found to be constitutional as drafted and authorized
under either, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, or Clause 8 itself.

